When the new Civil Code came into effect in 2014, it not only shocked the legal community but also somewhat struck a chord with the general public due to the provision that, besides the fact of the violation, no further proof of additional harm is required to be entitled to non-pecuniary damages (Section 2:52, Subsection 2 of the Civil Code).
Some people drew the conclusion from this provision that now the legal system has become a sort of "Wild West," where any kind of personal rights violation—whether a poorly made Facebook post, an offensive joke, or even the slightest physical harm, such as a minor scratch—would automatically trigger multimillion compensation claims. This is because, based purely on the literal wording of the Civil Code, the mere fact of a rights violation entitles the claimant to non-pecuniary damages, and proof of actual harm is no longer required. In essence, the law presumes that harm has occurred. However, this line of reasoning leads to painful practical consequences, starting with the question of whether the justice system would benefit at all from being burdened with trivial cases like these.
In answering this question, ultimately a teleological interpretation of the above provision prevailed, which at first glance may serve as a perfect example for a layperson of how lawyers can reach completely different conclusions from an apparently straightforward regulation. According to this interpretation, non-pecuniary damages must necessarily compensate for some form of non-material harm (“injury + compensation”), so if no such non-material harm has occurred to the injured party, their entitlement to non-pecuniary damages cannot exist. Thus, if the court finds that the specific violation is incapable of causing immaterial harm, or if the responsible party proves that the injured party has not suffered any non-pecuniary injury, the court will dismiss the claim. Similarly, a claim will not succeed if the violation of personality rights itself is not proven.
It is worth noting, however, that even under the above teleological interpretation, the scope for enforcing claims is much broader than what was available under the rules on non-pecuniary damages several decades ago. Under the earlier regulations, the injured party was required to prove that the harm caused had permanently or severely impeded their life or participation in social life. As a result, in many cases, even after the loss of a close relative, the injured parties were compelled to substantiate—with the help of a forensic psychiatric expert—that the death of the relative caused a pathological condition in their case, essentially a health impairment as a disadvantage. The current legal practice no longer demands this in cases of losing a close family member. In such tragic losses—provided that the right to live in a family unit is proven to be infringed—there is no need to establish the occurrence of a pathological condition to determine the hardship caused by the loss. It is evident without expert proof, for example, that the loss of a child deprives parents of the opportunity to participate in their child's life, share common experiences, or expect support in old age.
Despite the statutory provision mentioned above, the actual harm suffered by the injured party remains not only the legal basis for claiming non-pecuniary damages but also the fundamental factor determining the amount of compensation. Indeed, the extent of this harm largely influences the sum of the damages that can be successfully claimed from the insurer or directly from the liable party through legal proceedings, including court litigation. As evident, the enforcement of claims for non-pecuniary damages raises highly complex legal issues, and one should not hesitate to seek professional legal assistance in navigating them.
Dr. Attila Megyesi, specialist attorney in compensation law, Dr. Megyesi Law Office